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Summary
The article is devoted to the characteristics of the minority cabinet in the Scandinavian po-
litical systems and especially in Norway and its influence on political regime. Some inter-
esting aspects has been chosen to illustrate the problem of minority government in Nor-
way. Author explains normative and non-normative systemic factors that influenced the 
formation of the government cabinets without a sufficient majority in the parliament. The 
main thesis is that creation of minority governments is closely associated with the evolu-
tion of the party system and can be understood as a norm of political life in Scandinavia.
Streszczenie
Władza wykonawcza w skandynawskich systemach politycznych –  
problem gabinetu mniejszościowego w Norwegii (wybrane zagadnienia)
Artykuł poświęcony jest charakterystyce rządów mniejszościowych w skandynawskich sys-
temach politycznych, w tym zwłaszcza w Norwegii i ich wpływu na reżim polityczny. Kilka 
1 The author is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Systems of Highly 
Developed States of the Institute of Political Science and Journalism, Faculty of Social Sciences, 
University of Silesia in Katowice. Mail: robert.radek@us.edu.pl.
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ciekawych aspektów zostało wybranych celem zilustrowania problemu istnienia rządu mniej-
szościowego w Norwegii. Autor wyjaśnia, normatywne i nienormatywne czynniki systemowe, 
które wpłynęły na tworzenie gabinetów rządowych bez wystarczającej większości w parlamen-
cie. Główną tezą jest, że tworzenie rządów mniejszościowych jest ściśle związane z rozwojem 
systemu partyjnego i może być rozumiane jako norma w życiu politycznym Skandynawii.
*
I.
A parliamentary system is known as a system of government in which the mem-
bers of a legislative body try to determine the formation of the cabinet (the exec-
utive) and in which any majority of the legislature at almost any time may vote 
the cabinet out of office. But is this statement always true? In many states and 
under many circumstances it seems completely different. In the following arti-
cle it is planned to present some selected problems of minority governments that 
are characteristic element of executive power in Scandinavian political systems.
In many parliamentary systems, legislative majorities have instruments at 
their disposal (such as no-confidence votes and investiture votes) they may 
use to control the composition of the government and government policy. 
However it should be remembered that the application of the majority princi-
ple to parliamentary responsibility is not altogether strightforward. In many 
parliamentary regimes cabinets must at various junctures produce legislative 
majorities in order to perform their constitutional functions. Firstly, parlia-
mentary governments ought to be able to win a vote of confidence. This type 
of vote can come in three forms according to their origins. Vote of confidence 
may be demanded by the government itself (usually any time the government 
it wants) or by the opposition (example of Spanish regulation), or it may be 
required by the constitution (particularly likely at the time when a new gov-
ernment first presents itself to the legislature). This necessity of winning vote 
of confidence is very often called by experts a viability requirement, because 
if such voting ends negatively, the government simply vanishes2.
2 K. Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge University Press 2010, p. 5.
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Secondly, constitutional functions of government are also very often con-
nected with effectiveness, so it is obvious the goverrnments must be both via-
ble and effective. Such conditions are fullfilled by legislative coalitions which 
consist of the political parties from which the members of the governments 
are drawn. In colation-theoretic parlance, the assumption are that the coali-
tions over policy and office are identical and that they can be identified as the 
parties holding cabinet portfolios3.
Situation of majority government is much more complicated than 
we can consider and that issue must be explained more precisely. Par-
ties without cabinet portfolios may well support the government on con-
fidence votes, legislative bills or both. This situation happens very often 
with parties not in the portfolio coalition participating in the legislative 
coalition for most of the time. Sometimes even parties not represented in 
the cabinet may receive some office payoffs, like for example subcabinet 
offices, legislative chairmanship or different appointments in the public 
sphere. However, parties in the portfolio coalition are likely to be mem-
bers of the legislative coalition almost all the time and members of gov-
erning parties are particularly unwilling to get away with frequent de-
partures from the fold on votes of confidence. In that case coalitions over 
policy may well be larger than colations over portfolios, and viability co-
alitions may differ from effectiveness coalitions. These facts describe the 
crucial issue of minority government, which is always a kind of expecta-
tion to form a majority government4.
A minority government or cabinet, is most often characterized by experts 
as a cabinet formed in a parliamentary system when a political party or coali-
tion of parties does not have a majority of overall seats in the parliament. It is 
sworn into office, with or without the formal support of other parties, to en-
able a government to be formed. Under such a government, legislation can 
only be passed with the support of enough other members of the legislature 
to provide a majority, encouraging multi-partisanship. However, majority or 
minority governments do not altogether exhaust the set of possible cabinet 
solutions. A further possibility is non-partisan solution, such as a caretaker 
or business administration.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem, s. 6.
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It should be remembered that many minority and some majority govern-
ments are precisely caretaker governments, however such distinguishing char-
acteristic is not as important as nonpartisanship position of such cabinet. In 
the literature many authors very often concentrate on single-party and coa-
lition governments, and claim that they form under distinct conditions: sin-
gle-party government in majority situations, when one party itself controls 
a majority of the legislature and coalition government in minority situations, 
when no party is so in power.
In parliamentary democracies both minority and nonpartisan govern-
ments are treated as a kind of deviation. Nonpartisan governments violate 
the most fundamental norm, that of party government5. Minority govern-
ments violate the expectation that executive and legislative coalitions are 
the same coalitions and it is extremely difficult to say what would cause such 
distinction between them. Why would any party agree to support the gov-
ernment legislatively if it gets no portfolios in exchange? Also quite inter-
esting scientifically is finding the answer to the question why the opposi-
tion, by definition a majority coalition in parliament in that case, does not 
create the government and take the spoils of office for itself. These facts in-
dicate that minority government is a counterintuitive phenomenon in the 
world of parliamentary democracies, where the expectation of majority 
government is conventionally understood as an axiom. Any occurrence of 
minority government therefore seems to threaten the entire edifice of de-
ductive coalition theory. Given the counterintuitive nature of minority gov-
ernments, the question is whether they can be as easily dismissed as non-
partisan administration6.
Minority governments constitute over one third of all cabinets formed in 
parliaments without single party majority in Western Europe after World War 
II. Indeed, minority governments constitute the default cabinet solution in cer-
tain countries (e.g. Denmark, Norway, Sweden). Although their average dura-
tion may be somewhat smaller than that of majority coalitions, casual obser-
vation of the rather successful performance of certain countries with frequent 
5 See for example the following works: G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework 
for Analysis, Cambridge University Press 1976; R. Rose, The Problem of Party Government, 
London 1974.
6 K. Strøm, Minority..., p. 8.
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minority solutions over long periods of time suffices to demonstrate that mi-
nority governments are sensible governing alternatives to majority coalitions7.
It is important to underline that no region has experienced minority gov-
ernments more frequently than Scandinavia. In sharp contrast with Finland 
and Iceland, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Sweden and Norway 
have had minority governments for more than two-thirds of the post-World 
War II period. In Denmark, minority governments have been in office for 
more than four-fifths of that period8.
The Nordic countries comprise one of the most stable regions in the world 
of parliamentary democracies, All states in this region adopted parlimentary 
system of government and were fully democratised in the late nineteenth or 
early twentieth century. Each country managed to develop distinctive parlia-
mentary models, for example Denmark, Sweden and Norway, as parliamen-
tary monarchies, have relied extensively on minority governments while Fin-
land and Ireland rather implemented majority coalition cabinets9.
One of the crucial factors is that the Nordic countries possess a long parlia-
mentary history, for example Iceland’s Althingi operated as a consultative assem-
bly from the year 930 until 1800, when it was abolished. During the first quarter 
of the twentieth century all of the Nordic countries were fully democratised, and 
also an universal suffrage for parliamentary elections was introduced in this pe-
riod. Additionally, voting rights were also extended to women. All of these coun-
tries have for many decades operated a parliamentary form of government: Den-
mark from 1901 and Finland and Sweden from 1917. The other two countries had 
such systems prior to their independence. Norway’s first parliamentary cabinet 
was formed in 1884, and Iceland’s first was formed in 1904. This move to parlia-
mentarism can be seen as a democratisation of executive power, as control over 
the cabinet shifted from an unelected monarch to an elected parliament10.
7 T. Kalandrakis, Minority Governments: Ideology and Office, Boston Seminar 2002, p. 3 
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4754/kalandrakis.pdf (15.11.2016).
8 B.E. Rasch, Why Minority Governments? Executive-Legislative Relations in the Nordic 
Countries, [In:] Parliamentary Governments in the Nordic Countries at the Crossroads: Coping 
with Challenges from Europeanisation and Presidentialisation, eds. T. Persson, M. Wiberg, 
Stockholm 2011, p. 41.
9 T. Persson, M.Wiberg, The Nordic Model of Parliamentary Government and its Challenges, 
[In:] Parliamentary Governments, op.cit., p. 17.
10 Ibidem, p. 42.
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All of the Nordic parliaments today are unicameral, though until recent-
ly (the summer of 2009), the Norwegian Storting did partly function in a bi-
cameral manner in the legislative and controlling spheres. After each election, 
Norwegian legislators divided themselves into two sections − the Odelsting and 
the Lagting − to handle non-financial legislation. Iceland Althing had a simi-
lar quasi-bicameral system until 1991. Denmark and Sweden abolished their 
upper houses in 1953 and 1969, respectively11.
Another fundamental factor influencing governmental specifics of Scan-
dinavian countries is connected with electoral systems. In the Nordic region 
proportional representation has got a very long history. The first usage of pro-
potional system in the region was in Finland in 1906, when the unicameral, 
partly autonomous Eduskunta was established. By the year of 1920, propo-
tional represetnation had replaced single-member constituency systems in al-
most every country with the exception of Iceland12.
It should be noted that the current Nordic parliaments use quite sim-
ilar party-list systems of representation and only the Finnish system has 
anomalous features. Although Finland has no adjustment seats, the lev-
el of proportionality is still only slightly lower than in the other Nordic 
countries. Part of the reason for this level of proportionality is that the 
average multi-member district is quite large. With respect to propor-
tionality, Sweden and Denmark generally perform well. On some occa-
sions, deviations13 from proportionality have been extremely low. In most 
countries, there are significant differences in proportionality between 
elections, even though the institutional framework is constant. Also the 
size of the Nordic legislatures mainly ref lects population figures. Swe-
den, however, has a much larger parliament than one would expect, but 
this anomal is an inheritance from the bicameral era. The single cham-
ber Riksdag has almost as many seats as the previous first and second 
chambers combined14.
11 M. Grzybowski, Systemy konstytucyjne państw skandynawskich, Warszawa 2011, p. 58.
12 B. Grofman, A. Lijphart, The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic 
Countries, New York: 2002.
13 About deviations in the political systems see analysis in the following work: Wpływ 
deformacji wyborczych na systemy polityczne, red. J. Iwanek, Toruń 2014.
14 B.E. Rasch, Why Minority..., pp. 42–43.
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II.
According to collected data in Denmark, Sweden and Norway there have been 
more minority than majority cabinets (77, 76 and 62 percent of total govern-
ments, respectively). Most of the minority governments in all three countries 
have been single-party cabinets rather than coalitions. Denmark, however, 
has also had a substantial number of minority coalitions. Iceland, in contrast 
to the Scandinavian countries, has a history of majority coalitions; minority 
governments have been few and short-lived. The pattern in Finland is more 
mixed. Finland had minority governments before the World War II, but ma-
jority coalitions have been the norm since the 1940s. Scandinavia differs from 
Finland and Iceland15.
In many respects, the polities of the Nordic countries are very similar, and 
some of the differences clearly have no impact on government formation. One 
possible research strategy is to attempt to locate causal factors that are shared 
by the Scandinavian countries but not by the entire Nordic region. As men-
tioned above, it is also worth noting that some of the countries over time have 
slid from minority to majority governments (Finland) or vice versa (Sweden). 
Additionally, Norway has had long periods of majority parliamentarism, for 
instance from 1945 until 1961 and after the 2005 and 2009 elections. It also 
must be stated that constitutional frameworks have been relatively stable over 
time in all countries, so it is really difficult to trace the occurrence of minori-
ty governments back to differences in constitutional details. Instead, the most 
likely explanation for the Nordic patterns of government formation is the na-
ture of party systems in the region16.
Before analysing the nature of party systems in Scandinavian states it is 
crucial to present one of the fundamental clues proposed by V. Herman and 
J. Pope17. They did not confirm previous traditional analysis, according to which 
minority governments was explained as the result of party fragmentation 
and polarisation. Sometimes it was also pointed to the gradual development 
of a multi-party legislature and a reluctance to enter coalitions as the main 
15 Ibidem, p. 45.
16 Ibidem, p. 47.
17 See more: V. Herman, J. Pope, Minority Governments In Western Democracies, “British 
Journal of Political Science” 1973, Vol. 3.
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background for the formation of minority government. Herman and Pope 
demonstrated that minority governments were more common than previous-
ly assumed and suggested a variety of reasons for this phenomenon. Firstly, 
a substantial proportion of the minority governments they studied were care-
taker administrations. These governments typically came to power as a result 
of some sort of crisis and were deliberatively established for only a short pe-
riod of time. Secondly, some minority governments took office because one 
or more coalition partners withdrew from majority coalitions. Thirdly, a few 
minority governments came to office because elections that usually provided 
one party with a legislative majority surprisingly ended with no party win-
ning a majority of seats (and, typically, a new election was held soon thereaf-
ter). Fourthly, minority cabinets arose because extreme parties on either side 
of the political spectrum were not credible, reliable, formal coalition partners 
for parties closer to the centre. Fifthly, and probably most interesting in this 
context, some minority cabinets were formed in situations in which one of the 
parties fell only a few seats short of a legislative majority. Often in such cas-
es, the dominant party formed a one-party minority government and usual-
ly did so with the formal support of one of the smaller parties18.
Moving to description of party systems and its influence on governemnt 
formation in Scandinavia it is important to stress that all of the analysed coun-
tries have had multi-party systems at least since the beginning of twentieth 
century. Of course there are many important differences among the coun-
tries in this respect, and marked changes in the number and relative size of 
the parties have occurred over time.
It is worth to take a closer look at party systems in Norway, to illustrate as-
pects mentioned above. Until the early 1970s Norway had one of the most sta-
ble party systems in Western Europe and similar in format to Swedish and 
Danish. The origin of this system is dated for 1880s and emerged around 1920 
into a system called ‘the Scandinavian five-party model’. There were also de-
fined six dimentions of political cleavage, determined by economic, geograph-
ical and cultural circumstances. The class cleavage and the sectoral urban-ru-
ral cleavage were determined by economic conflicts in the labour market and 
the commodity market, respectively. Second, territorial cleavage between phe-
18 B.E. Rasch, Why Minority..., p. 48.
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riphery and center party overlapped with additional three cultural cleavages: 
a socio-cultural conflict between two different versions of the Norvegian lan-
guage: a moral conflict focused in large part on the abuse of alkohol and ar-
ticulated teetotalist movement, and a religious conflict over the doctrines and 
organization of the Lutheran state chuch and its role in social life. These cleav-
ages influenced Norwegian politics and developed its party system. The major 
division, however, not only in shaping electoral preferences, but also in terms 
of government alternatives, has been along the left-right axis, between social-
ists (a dominant Labour Party called ‘Arbeiderpartiet’ and smaller Communist 
Party called ‘Norges Kommunistiske Parti’) and non-socialists (the Conserva-
tists called ‘Høyre’, the Liberals, called ‘Venstre’ and the agrarian Centre Party, 
called ‘Senterpartiet’)19. Obviously, such model has been changing during the 
following decades. There were many deviations from this first model20. In 1933 
for instance Christian People’s Party evoluated from religious fracion of Liber-
als. After the onset of the Cold War the Communist Party gradually faded into 
oblivion and finally lost its parliamentary representation in 1961. Through the 
1960s Norway had one of the most stable party systems in Western Europe. The 
question of Norwegian membership in the European Community during the 
first EC referendum in 1972 also influenced the party system by generating con-
flict between political parties. Norway began to experience more party system 
fragmentation and volatility than at any time since the 1920s. As the result the 
previously dominating Liberals was split into two parties – one supporting the 
idea of integration, and second being against a closer cooperation throught this 
structure21. After the early 1970s about one out of three voters changed parti-
sanship from one election to the next, as compared to the 1960s when the cor-
responding figure was about one out of four. In the 1993 Storting election, in-
dividual volatility reached almost 44 per cent, a proportion that was virtually 
unchanged in 1997 and 200122.
19 H.M. Narud, K. Strøm, Norway: A Fragile Coalition Order, [In:] Coalition Governments 
in Western Europe, eds. W.C. Müller, K. Strøm, Oxford University Press 2006, p. 159.
20 See more about the evolution of party system in Norway: M. Grzybowski, Norwegia. 
Zarys systemu ustrojowego, Kraków 2015, pp. 64–86.
21 See more about changes in the Norwegian party system – ibidem, p. 160.
22 H.M. Narud, K. Strøm, Norway: Virtual Parliamentarism, [In:] Delegation and Ac-
countability in Parliamentary Democracies, eds. K. Strøm, W.C. Müller, T. Bergman, Oxford 
University Press 2006, p. 526.
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Evolution of the post-war Norwegian party system could be described as 
a change from unipolar, through a bipolar, to a multipolar format. The histo-
ry of this development is summerized by experts, as follows:
1. Social Democratic Predominance: 1945–1961. In this period the Labour 
Party enjoyed a predominat position and four consecutive elections 
yielded outright parliamentary majorities and a single-party Labour 
governments. The party system was at this time unipolar and social-
ist parties jointly obtained 51 per cent of the popular vote in all elec-
tions. The centre parties like for instance Liberals, the Centre Party 
and Christian People’s Party was gathering about 29 per cent and the 
rest – 20 per cent of voters – were supporting the Conservatives. It is 
crucial to remember that only marginal electoral shift occured from 
one election to another.
2. Bipolar Stability: 1961–1972. The 1961 emergence of the Socialist Peo-
ple’s Party caused some erosion of Labour’s support, while the non-so-
cialist parties gained in strenght and cohesion. There was also a slight 
increase of the legislative parties. Till the 1970s electoral volatility re-
maided low and socialist and non-socialist blocs were extremely even-
ly balanced and minority Labour governments alternated with bour-
geois coalitions.
3. Bipolar Fragmentation: 1972–1990. The European Community refer-
endum in 1972 began a strong change in the party system. It is clear 
if compare the effective number of parties that increased from 3,2 in 
1969 to 4,1 in 1973. From the mid 1970s on, a massive shift could be 
observed in favour of the parties of the right: the Conservatives with 
Progress Party, popularly reffered to as ’the swing to the right’. This 
situation corresponded with a decline in support for Labour and the 
parties of the Centre. The highest suport for Conservatives was in 
the early 1980s, from which they have gradually lost their populari-
ty. The Progress Party has experienced even greater and less predict-
able volatility, but have gone on particular successes in the elections 
in 1989 and 1997.
4. Multipolar Fragmentation from 1990. The legacy of the political up-
heaval started in 1970s has been substancially weakened Labour Par-
ty, signficant new parties on the extreme left and right, a resurgence 
125Robert Radek  • Executive power in the scandinavian political systems
of the right and a simultaneous atrophy of the non-socialist centre. 
The fragmentation, volatility and some polarisation was a visible lon-
ger term party system trend23.
At the electoral level, increased competition between tthe parties visi-
bly reflected in the increased number of floating voters. After the early 1970s 
about one-third electors shifted position from one election to the next, as 
compared to the 1960s when the corresponding figure was one-fourth. In 
the Storting elections of the 1990s, gross individual volatility has reached al-
most 45 per cent24.
According to analysis of Kaare Strøm and Hanne Marthe Narrud Norwe-
gian parties, both those on the Left and those on the right, traditionally had 
strong mass membership organizations. For many years about fifteen per cent 
of the electorate were dues-paying members, according to reports from party 
headquarters. In some smaller parties, particularly the Centre Party, the ratio 
of members to voters has at times been as high as one in three. However, na-
tional election surveys indicate that during the 1990s party membership de-
clined to around 10–11 per cent. In such parties as the Labour Party and the 
Liberals, it had the late 1990s come closer to 5 per cent than to double digits. 
According to the parties’ own records, the Labour Party and the Conserva-
tives (the two largest membership organizations) both lost about one-third of 
their gross membership figures between 1993 and 1999, whereas the smaller 
parties all suffered somewhat smaller losses25.
III.
The party system and election rules are important factors that influence cab-
inet position in Norway and other modern democracies. Also quite crucial is 
cabinet formation to understand rules regulating executive power in Norway.
Formally, the Norwegian Constitution of 1814, which is currently the oldest 
living codified constitution in Europe and indeed second only to that of the 
United States in the democratic world, gives the King wide discretion to ap-
23 H.M. Narud, K. Strøm, Norway: A Fragile Coalition..., pp. 160–161.
24 Ibidem, p. 163.
25 H.M. Narud, K. Strøm, Norway: Virtual..., p. 526.
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point the members of the cabinet (formally known as the King’s Council). In 
practice, however, the King has exerted no influence on the composition of 
any cabinet since 1928, and it is questionable whether he could constitution-
ally exercise any such authority today. In reality, when he formally calls upon 
someone to form a new government, the King always follows the advice of the 
leaders of the parliamentary parties. In practice, the choice of a Prime Minis-
ter-designate has rarely been difficult. The use of informateurs has no codified 
place in the Norwegian Constitution, and the practice has been rare indeed. 
In the postwar period, there is only one notable case. In the difficult cabinet 
crisis of 1971, when a bourgeois majority coalition had just broken down over 
the EC issue and the Prime Minister’s conduct in this area, the King formally 
gave the President of the Storting, Conservative Bernt Ingvaldsen, the man-
date of investigating the opportunities for another non-socialist coalition. It 
was obvious that the role of Ingvaldsen, a senior, right-wing, and somewhat 
formal member of his party, was purely that of an informateur. At any rate, 
his efforts failed for no fault of his own, and the informateur institution has 
never again been used. But on the other hand if the recent trend toward par-
ty system fragmentation and coalition fluidity continues, however, it is not 
inconceivable that a stronger tradition of informateurship may develop26.
Because of the lack of formal rules and mechanisms, Norwegian govern-
ment formation is best described as ‘free-style bargaining’. One of the most 
fundamental procedural rule is called ‘negative parliamentarism’, that is, the 
rule that governments can be invested and sustained as long as there is no ex-
plicite majority vote of opposition in Parliament. Norwegian parliamentary 
procedure contains several more or less formal rules that contribute to this 
practice. The following rules are:
1. There is no formal vote of investiture, and governments are assumed 
to have the confidence of the Storting until the opposite has been 
demonstrated.
2. The Prime Minister is neither formally nor by convention expected 
to hand in his (or her) resignation at the end of a parliamentary term 
or on any other formal occasion (e.g. the accession to the throne of 
a new King).
26 Ibidem, p. 532.
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3. Moreover, the prevailing interpretation of confidence and no-confi-
dence votes is permissive and allows the cabinet to remain in office 
under circumstances in which it might otherwise have to design27.
Table 1. Governments in Norway from 1945 to 2016
No. Cabinet Took office Left office
Prime  
Minister
Party(s)
Type of the 
government
1
Gerhardsen’s  
First Cabinet
25 June 1945 4 November 
1945
Einar Gerhard-
sen
Labour, Conse-
rvative, Liberal, 
Agrarian, 
Communist
minority 
coalition
2
Gerhardsen’s  
Second Cabinet
5 November 
1945
18 November 
1951
Einar Gerhard-
sen
Labour single-party 
majority
3
Torp’s  
Cabinet
9 November 
1951
21 January 
1955
Oscar Torp Labour single-party 
majority
4
Gerhardsen’s  
Third Cabinet
22 January 
1955
27 August 1963 Einar Gerhard-
sen
Labour single-party 
minority
5
Lyng’s  
Cabinet
28 August 1963 24 September 
1963
John Lyng Conservative, 
Centre, Chri-
stian Democra-
tic, Liberal
minority 
coalition
6
Gerhardsen’s 
Fourth Cabinet
25 September 
1963
11 October 
1965
Einar Gerhard-
sen
Labour single-party 
minority
7
Borten’s  
Cabinet
12 October 
1965
16 March 1971 Per Borten Conservative, 
Liberal, Centre, 
Christian 
Democratic
majority 
coalition 
(1965–1969)
minority 
coalition 
(1969–1971)
8
Bratteli’s  
First Cabinet
17 March 1971 16 October 
1972
Trygve Bratteli Labour single-party 
minority
9
Korvald’s  
Cabinet
17 October 
1972
11 October 
1973
Lars Korvald Centre, Chri-
stian Democra-
tic, Liberal
minority 
coalition
10
Bratteli’s  
Second Cabinet
12 October 
1973
14January 1976 Trygve Bratteli Labour single-party 
minority
27 Ibidem, p. 533 and further.
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No. Cabinet Took office Left office
Prime  
Minister
Party(s)
Type of the 
government
11
Nordli’s  
Cabinet
15 January 
1976
3 February 
1981
Odvar Nordli Labour single-party 
minority
12
Brundtland’s  
First Cabinet
4 February 
1981
13 October 
1981
Gro Harlem 
Brundtland
Labour single-party 
minority
13
Willoch’s  
First Cabinet
14 October 
1981
7 June 1983 Kåre Willoch Conservative single-party 
minority
14
Willoch’s  
Second Cabinet
8 June 1983 8 May 1986 Kåre Willoch Conservative, 
Christian 
Democratic, 
Centre
majority 
coalition
15
Brundtland’s  
Second Cabinet
9 May 1986 15 October 
1989
Gro Harlem 
Brundtland
Labour single-party 
minority
16
Syse’s  
Cabinet
16 October 
1989
2 November 
1990
Jan P. Syse Conservative, 
Christian 
Democratic, 
Centre
minority 
coalition
17
Brundtland’s  
Third Cabinet
3 November 
1990
24 October 
1996
Gro Harlem 
Brundtland
Labour single-party 
minority
18
Jagland’s  
Cabinet
25 October 
1996
16 October 
1997
Thorbjørn 
Jagland
Labour single-party 
minority
19
Bondevik’s  
First Cabinet
17 October 
1997
16 March 2000 Kjell Magne 
Bondevik
Christian Demo-
cratic, Centre, 
Liberal
minority 
coalition
20
Stoltenberg’s  
First Cabinet
17 March 2000 18 October 
2001
Jens Stolten-
berg
Labour single-party 
minority
21
Bondevik’s  
Second Cabinet
19 October 
2001
16 October 
2005
Kjell Magne 
Bondevik
Conservative, 
Christian Demo-
cratic, Liberal
minority 
coalition
22
Stoltenberg’s  
Second Cabinet
17 October 
2005
15 October 
2013
Jens Stolten-
berg
Labour, Socialist 
Left, Centre
majority 
coalition
23
Solberg’s  
Cabinet
16 October 
2013
incumbent Erna Solberg Conservative, 
Progress Party
minority 
coalition
Source: Own study based on information from M. Grzybowski, Norwegia. Zarys..., pp. 182, 
186, 194; M. Grzybowski, Systemy konstytucyjne państw skandynawskich, Warszawa 2011, 
p. 161; H.M. Narud, K. Strøm, Norway: A Fragile Coalition Order, [In:] Coalition Governments 
in Western Europe, eds. W.C. Müller, K. Strøm, Oxford University Press 2006, p. 171; K. Strøm, 
Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge University Press 2010, pp. 196–197.
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It is stressed in the literature that the fluidity and informality of the Nor-
wegian Constitution has a permissive impact on coalition bargaining. Spe-
cifically, it has favoured the formation of numerically weak governments. 
Norway is one of the world’s leaders in the frequency of minority govern-
ments, especially from the 1970s onwards. Till 1961, the Labour Party dom-
inated Norwegian elections, and the country experienced stable, single-par-
ty, majority governments. The 1961 election, however, deprived the Labour 
Party of a parliamentary majority, which it has never again recaptured. After 
that severe change, Norwegian cabinets have more often been ‘undersized’, 
and coalitions have been less common than single-party cabinets. Moreo-
ver, in most cases in which (non-socialist) coalitions have formed, the coa-
lition-building process has stopped short of a majority. Even in these cases, 
then, some ‘coalition avoidance’ has taken place. While this record no doubt 
has multiple causes, part of the explanation surely lies in the permissive in-
stitutional rules concerning government formation and confidence. From 
the first postwar election in 1945 till now, there have been twenty-four cabi-
nets: fourteen single-party administrations and ten coalitions. Five cabinets 
included parties that collectively controlled a majority of the seats in the 
Storting (around 20% of the post-war cabintes), whereas nineteen (around 
80% of the post-war cabinets) were minority cabinets. Most of these relied 
on ad hoc parliamentary support. While the composition and size of Nor-
wegian governments have changed substantially over the postwar period, 
other patterns of cabinet formation have almost remained stable. Howev-
er there has been no peacetime coalition between Socialist and non-social-
ist parties for many years but this rule has been changed after election in 
2005 when a wide majority colation was formed. In fact, the Norwegian La-
bour Party was for many post-war decades the only major social democrat-
ic party in Western Europe that tried not to enter a cabinet coalition with 
any bourgeois party. Labour has eschewed coalitions not only with non-so-
cialist parties, but also with the smaller parties to its left. This tactic finally 
collapsed and we face now some new tendencies in the cabinet formation 
in Norway at the beginning of twenty-first century28.
Firstly, it must be stated the increse of further ‘erosion’ of electorates of 
main Norwegian parties, so none of the parties can aspire to form a homog-
28 Ibidem.
130 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2016/6
enous majority government. Secondly, in the cabinet formation process there 
were vanished two crucial barriers which were stable for many years before. 
One was a habit not to create government coalition between Labours and 
center parties and another was including into government coalition a par-
ty that for many years was treated as an anti-system protest party (Progress 
Party). Thirdly, some new ideas connected with supporting government were 
invented (for example a model of external support of government instead of 
joining a formal coalition)29.
In conclusion minority governments in Norway should not always be 
criticised. The strong position of parliament means that parties in opposi-
tion have considerable decision-making clout. In this case the participation 
in government is not necessary to gain influence and as a result a minori-
ty governments become more likey At the turn of twentieth and twenty-first 
century the slight evolution of government formation may be noticed, but it 
is not a kind of unexpected revolution. There are no visible preffered parties 
that can legitimize its mandate to form a stable majority government. More 
coalition governments are more possible and this fact reflects the changes in 
the party system and transfer of electoral preferences. Analisys showed also 
a kind of balance between maintance of majority coalition governments and 
minority coalition governments in Norwegian politics. The last observation 
confirms that a role and impact of minority cabinets in Norway is still alive 
and actual and can be treated as a norm in spite of changes in the party sys-
tem that also can be noticed.
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